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Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security in communications
based on the laws of quantum physics. In this work, we report an implementation of quantum-
secured data transmission in the infrastructure of Sberbank of Russia in standard communication
lines in Moscow The experiment is realized on the basis of the already deployed urban fibre-optic
communication channels with significant losses. We realize the decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol
using the one-way scheme with polarization encoding for generating keys. Quantum-generated keys
are then used for continuous key renewal in the hardware devices for establishing a quantum-secured
VPN Tunnel between two offices of Sberbank. The used hybrid approach offers possibilities for long-
term protection of the transmitted data, and it is promising for integrating into the already existing
information security infrastructure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent progress in creating quantum algorithms posses
a serious threat on the central element of currently used
tools for ensuring information security, the key distri-
bution infrastructure. The majority of methods for key
distribution is based on the assumption of the compu-
tational complexity of several mathematical tasks, such
as large number factorization [1]. However, Shor’s algo-
rithm for a quantum computer allows solving these prob-
lems in a polynomial time [2]. Moreover, absence of an
efficient classical (non-quantum) algorithm breaking such
public-key cryptosystems still remains unproved.
Quantum computers have less of an effect on symmet-
ric cryptographic primitives, such as GOST block cipher
if it is assumed that the master key has been distributed
secretly, since Shor’s algorithm does not apply, and then
exponential speedups are not expected [2]. Nevertheless,
Grover’s search algorithm [3] would allow quantum com-
puters a quadratic speedup in brute force search, which
means that the key management in terms of the key size
and the key refresh time for such primitives needs to be
reconsidered.
An ultimate and practical solution for the key distribu-
tion problem is the QKD technology. The QKD method
uses the possibility to encode information in states of sin-
gle photons, transmit them through optical channels, and
measure on the receiver side [4–6]. By virtue of a number
quantum-mechanical phenomena, this allows one to ex-
clude possibilities for undetectable eavesdropping [4]. It
is important to note that the method for preparation and
measurements of quantum states, so-called QKD proto-
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Figure 1. Setup for QKD using the polarization-encoding
scheme with the light source L1, intensity modulator IM,
half-wave plate λ/2, phase modulators PM1 and PM2, vari-
able optical attenuator VOA, synchronization laser L2, an-
alyzing detector AD, wavelength-division multiplexing filter
WDM, polarization controller PC, synchronization detector
SD, quantum channel (urban fiber-optics channel) QC, polar-
ization beam splitter PBS, and single-photon detectors SPD1
and SPD2. The polarization maintaining fiber is used for con-
nections between L1 and PM1 for Alice, and between PM2
and PBS for Bob.
col, should guarantee the absence of undetectable eaves-
dropping. Presently, decoy-state BB84 QKD is a stan-
dard technique, which provides security and significant
key rates for a large distance between parties [7–14].
In this work, we report the experimental demonstra-
tion of quantum-secured data transmission in standard
communication lines in Moscow. Due to significant losses
in the urban fibre-optic communication lines, we use the
recently suggested one-way scheme of key distribution
with fast polarization encoding [15]. The setup is based
on LiNbO3 phase modulators, single laser source for
states generation, and two single-photon detectors (see
Fig. 1). An important improvement in compare with re-
cent experiments on realizing three-node QKD network
in Moscow [16] is the inclusion of an intensity modulator
to the optical scheme as well as updating control units
and post-processing software for the implementation of
the decoy-state QKD protocol. Quantum-generated keys
then used for continuous key renewal in the hardware de-
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2vices for establishing quantum-secured VPN Tunnel by
Amicon [17]. The used fiber-optic communication lines
are deployed between the Sberbank office on Bol’shaya
Andron’yevskaya street (Alice) and the Sberbank office
on Vavilova street (Bob): the one is used for QKD and
another one for information transmitting.
II. EXPERIMENT
The optical scheme (Fig. 1) realizing decoy-state BB84
QKD works as follows [15]. The laser source (L1) emits
polarized optical pulses at 1550 nm. Then half-wave plate
transforms the polarization state so that the amplitudes
along the crystal axes of Alices phase modulator (PM
1) are equal to each other. This allows Alice to encode
bits of the secret key in polarization states with the help
of the modulator. To weaken the pulse, a variable opti-
cal attenuator (VOA) is used. After the quantum chan-
nel (QC), the piezo-driven polarization controller (PC)
compensates SOP (state of polarization ) drifts and ro-
tates it so that the polarization components along the
lithium niobate crystal axes switch places, compensating
the birefringence of LiNbO3. Bob’s modulator PM 2 is
used for basis selection. Finally, a half-wave plate (λ/2)
converts SOP for polarization beam splitter (PBS) to dis-
tinguish states with the help of single-photon detectors
(SPD1, SPD2). The decoy-state QKD protocol is real-
ized by using intensity modulators. Polarization recali-
bration is applied once quantum bit error rate (QBER) in
decoy pulses rises above the 8% value. Then the gradient
descent algorithm is applied for polarization controller to
minimize the QBER. As soon as QBER over all types of
pulses is under 5.5%, the calibration is over and key gen-
eration is restarted.
The parameters of the QKD setup implementation are
as follows: number of pulses in train 9.82×104, repetition
rate of pulses in train 312,5 MHz, detectors efficiencies
are 10% and 6.4% (for SPD1 and SPD2, respectively; see
Fig. 1), detectors dead time 5 µs, dark count probabil-
ity 3 × 10−7, fiber channel losses 14.05 dB in the chan-
nel of 25 km length (which corresponds to ≈ 70km of
standard fiber-optic communication line with 0.2dB/km
losses), and additional losses on Bob’s side 6 dB. The
communication line between two server rooms consists of
8 segments (6 segments outside the buildings and 2 in-
side the buildings). Few connections give us about ≈4%
of reflection. Toward to prevent the detector blinding,
we separate clock synchronisation signal and quantum
signal not only in wavelength but also on time. The re-
sulting raw key generation rate in our experiments is ≈2
kbit/s. After realization of the QKD session, we real-
ize the standard sifting procedure, which is needed for
dropping the positions with inconsistent bases from the
raw quantum keys, by using authenticated communica-
tion channel (see below). The resulting keys are called
sifted keys. The decoy states statistics [14] is announced
on this stage as well.
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Figure 2. QKD technology stack, where control units realize
the decoy-state QKD protocol. As a result of their work, raw
quantum keys go to the basis reconciliation and to the post-
processing procedures realized on conjugation units. After
these stages, final secret keys can be requested by Amicon
devices for establishing VPN tunnels.
III. POST-PROCESSING PROCEDURE AND
APPLICATION LEVEL
The sifted keys are the input for a post-processing pro-
cedure [18]. The post-processing procedure includes a
number of stages: information reconciliation, parameter
estimation, privacy amplification, and, finally, authen-
tication check. First, sifted keys from the hardware de-
vices go through the information reconciliation stage. We
use the recently suggested symmetric blind information
reconciliation method [19]. It uses low-density parity-
check (LDPC) codes with frame length lframe = 4000.
For a coarse tuning of the code rate we employ a pool of
LDPC codes consisting of nine codes with the following
rates: R = {0.9, 0.85, . . . , 0.55, 0.5}. For a fine tuning
of the code rate, we employ the shortening and punctur-
ing techniques [20, 21]. We note that the total number
of shortening and puncturing bits was kept at constant
level as follows:
lsp = 0.05lframe = 200 bits. (1)
The sub-block length of sifted key processed in a single
launch of the symmetric blind reconciliation is as follows:
lsift = lframe − lsp = 3800 bits. (2)
Here, Nsift = 100 sub-blocks of sifted keys were processed
in parallel launches of the symmetric blind reconciliation
method. The resulting length of the sifted key processed
in one round of the post-processing procedure was Lsift =
380000 bits.
After performing the information reconciliation stage,
there is still a certain probability that uncorrected errors
3remain. In order to detect possible remaining errors, we
use the subsequent verification protocol with the use of
-universal hash functions [22]. The probability of the
presence of errors after successful verification of the block
of Nsift bits is bounded by the value of ver = 1.4×10−11
with the use of a hash-tag of 50 bit length. Due to the
low level of frame error rate of the employed LDPC codes,
we obtain the length of verified keys Lver to be almost
always equal to the length of the processed sifted keys
Lver ≈ Lsift.
The next stage in the post processing is the parame-
ter estimation stage. On this stage, the parties obtain
the actual level of the QBER q for their key blocks via
direct comparison of the keys before and after the infor-
mation reconciliation. If the value of QBER appeared to
be higher than the critical value needed for efficient pri-
vacy amplification (11% for the decoy-state BB84 proto-
col), the parties receive a warning message about possi-
ble eavesdropping. Otherwise, the verified key blocks go
to the privacy amplification stage, and estimated QBER
is used in next rounds of the information reconciliation
stage. In our experiments, QBER was on the level of
4.8%-6%, so we were able successfully implement the pri-
vacy amplification procedure.
The aim of the privacy amplification stage is to reduce
potential information of an adversary about the verified
blocks to a negligible quantity [4]. Such a reduction can
be achieved by a contraction of the input verified key into
a shorter key. The length of the secret key is computed
as follows:
Lsec = LverYˆ1(1− h(qˆ1))− leakec − 5 log2(1/pa), (3)
where Lver is length of the verified key, Yˆ1 is an estimation
of the portion of the sifted key bits generated from single
photons pulses,
h(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x)
is binary entropy function, qˆ1 is an estimation of the
QBER for single photon pulses, leakec is total number
of bits disclosed in information reconciliation and verifi-
cation stages, and pa is the failure probability of privacy
amplification stages (pa = 10
−12 in our setup).
The estimates of Yˆ1 and qˆ1 were obtained using the
decoy-states method. We employed three types of pulses
with different intensities µ ≈ 0.175 (signal), ν ≈ 0.067
(decoy), and λ ≈ 0.008 (vacuum). The corresponding
probabilities of generating each type of pulses were as
follows: pµ = 0.5, pν = pλ = 0.25. We note that the
sifted key was generated using signal pulses only [14].
The length of the secret key can be then calculated as a
function of the following form:
Lsec = Lsec(Lver, µ, ν, λ,Nµ, nµ, Nν , nν , Nλ, nλ, q), (4)
where Nx and nx are the numbers of sent and detected
states of intensity x ∈ {µ, ν, λ}. The detailed description
of the function Lsec can be found in Ref. [14].
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Figure 3. QBER (upper curve) and the length of final keys
(lower curve) are shown as functions of the generated block
indices. Each block of the final key is obtained from a block
of the sifted keys of Lsift = 380000 bits length.
After the calculation of the length of the secret key,
the privacy amplification can be realized. On this step,
the block of the secret key is computed as a result of
application of the 2-universal hash function to the verified
key [18]. In our setup the Toeplitz hashing is used.
At the final state, the parties need to check the authen-
ticity of their communications over the classical channel
by an exchange of hash values of the whole incoming
traffic. For this purpose, we employ the information-
theoretically secure Toeplitz hashing together with one
time-pad encryption [18]. The length of the hash value is
lauth = 40 bit, which bounds the probability of successful
man in the middle attack at the level of
auth = 2× 2−lauth < 2× 10−12. (5)
If the authenticity is verified, the parties reserve 2lauth
bits of their secret quantum keys for the next post-
processing round and obtain
Lfin = Lsec − 2lauth (6)
bits of the final key that can be used in cryptographic
purposes. We then obtain the length of the secret key
Lfin to be 0.03 . . . 0.13 of Lver depending on QBER (see
Fig. 3). The final security level of the obtained key is
given by
QKD = ver + pa + auth < 2× 10−11. (7)
As a result, after the post-processing procedure, from
2 kbit/s of sifted keys, we obtain about 0.1 kbit/s of
secret keys. This value can be improved significantly by
fine tuning of the parameters of the decoy-state QKD
protocol, stabilization of the hardware, and improving
characteristics of the fiber-optic communication line.
After post processing, quantum-generated keys are
used for continuous key renegotiation in the hardware
devices for establishing quantum-secured VPN Tunnel.
4The VPN Tunnel performs L3-level encryption using the
Russian symmetric block cipher algorithm (GOST 28147-
89) with a 256 bit key size. In our experimental tests,
hardware device establishing the VPN Tunnel was con-
nected to the QKD setup via the Ethernet channel. Us-
ing the special API-protocol the VPN Tunnel device re-
quests a new quantum key every 400 seconds, which adds
to the master keys of the device. In the case of success-
ful obtaining symmetric quantum-generated keys on the
both sides, then encryption of transmitted data is per-
formed using both session and quantum keys, i.e. a hy-
brid scheme. Data transfer rate in the hybrid encryption
scheme is about 1 Gbit/s. Up to our knowledge, this is a
first in Russia experimental demonstration of quantum-
secured data transmission in urban fibre-optic commu-
nication lines, while previously announced results were
about implementations of QKD protocols only [23, 24].
IV. CONCLUSIONS
QKD technology provides the ultimate in quantum-
safe security, guaranteeing provably secure key exchange
for encryption and other security devices on point-to-
point backbone, networks, and distributed ledgers, such
as blockchains [25]. We emphasize that the realized hy-
brid approach, where quantum-generated keys are used
for continuous key renewal in already existing informa-
tion security solutions, offers the method for long-term
data protection in the post-quantum era. Furthermore,
we expect that using a high-quality fiber-optic commu-
nication line (e.g. with 0.2 dB/km loss coefficient) and
improving all stabilization issues in hardware and soft-
ware results in an increase of the key generation rate up
to 100 kbit/s, which is enough for transmitting audio in-
formation in the one-time pad regime.
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